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Perpetuation of the Foreign Earned
Income Exclusion: U.S. International
Tax Policy, Political Reality, and the
Necessity of Understanding How the
Two Intertwine
Hale E. Sheppard*
ABSTRACT

This Article discusses Section 911 of the Internal Revenue
Code, also known as the Foreign Earned Income Exclusion
(FEIE), as an example of a provision that has been sustained,
not on the basis of sound economic analysis and compliance
with established U.S. international tax policy, but rather
because of effective lobbying and political circumstance. First
providing an overview of the U.S. system of worldwide taxation,
and the place of the FEIE within that framework, Mr. Sheppard
explores the forces underlying the perpetuationof the FEIE. He
demonstrates the that FEIE is inconsistent with each of the
primary components of U.S. international tax policy, including
meeting the revenue needs of the U.S. government in a fair and
equitable manner, minimizing the burden of tax compliance and
administration by reducing tax complexity, fostering economic
efficiency through internationaltax neutrality, and ensuring the
competitiveness of U.S. multinational businesses, but explains
that the repeal of the FEIE is nevertheless improbable in the
foreseeable future as a result of various political realities, such as
the rebuilding of Iraq, the upcoming elimination or radical
modification of major tax-based export promotion programs, a
dwindling global presence of U.S. citizens due to fatal diseases
and terrorism, and significant U.S. unemployment rates. He
concludes by reemphasizing the complexity of tax policy issues,
and by reminding the tax practitioner that a failure to
* Hale E. Sheppard (B.S., M.A., J.D., University of Kansas; LL.M., Universidad de
Chile; LL.M., University of Florida) is an attorney specializing in international tax
planning, cross-border business transactions, and tax controversies. Mr. Sheppard
dedicates this article to those intrepid professors who, contrary to the conventional
pedagogical methods of law schools, strive to create learning environments in which
students are not only permitted, but outright encouraged, to ask questions about the
law, policy, and everything in between.
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comprehend the policy rationales behind a particularprovision
or set of provisions compromises the ability to dispense accurate
and thorough advice.
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FOREIGN EARNED INCOME EXCLUSION

I. INTRODUCTION

Why? This question is undoubtedly the hallmark of curious
children, those inquisitive youngsters tugging at coattails while
incessantly asking, "Why, Mommy? Why, Daddy?" As fastidious as
this inquiry may be to some, it should be foremost on the mind of all
tax practitioners, especially those working in the ultra-complicated
field of international taxation. For if one fails to comprehend the
policy rationales behind a particular provision or set of provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code (the Code), it is highly improbable that he
or she will be able to dispense accurate and thorough advice in this
area. 1 Equally (if not more) important for tax professionals in many
cases is to understand the political climate existing at the time that
specific parts of the Code were introduced, modified, or repealed.
Indeed, to answer the pivotal question of why the Code functions in a
certain manner or why a particular group of taxpayers receives
special treatment, it is imperative to examine the applicable political
realities.
Section 911 of the Code, which is also known as the Foreign
Earned Income Exclusion (FEIE), is an example of a provision that
has been sustained, not on the basis of sound economic analysis and
compliance with established U.S. international tax policy, but rather
because of effective lobbying and political circumstance. In an
attempt to underscore the importance of thinking well beyond the
express words of the Code, this Article explores in considerable depth
the forces (both patent and latent) underlying the perpetuation of the
FEIE.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the U.S. system of
worldwide taxation, as well as an explanation of how the FEIE relates
to this system. Part III gives details regarding the recent congressional
attempt to repeal the FEIE. Part IV describes the primary components
of U.S. international tax policy, including meeting the revenue needs of
the U.S. government in a fair and equitable manner, minimizing the
burden of tax compliance and administration by reducing tax
complexity, fostering economic efficiency through international tax
neutrality, and ensuring the competitiveness of U.S. multinational
businesses. Part V demonstrates that, despite ardent arguments by
FETE backers to the contrary, Section 911 is inconsistent with each of
the international tax policies. Part VI then explains that the repeal of
the FETE is nevertheless improbable in the foreseeable future as a

1.
Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this Article to the "Code" are
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Unless otherwise indicated, all
references in this Article to "Section" or "Sections" are to sections in the Code.
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result of various political realities, such as the rebuilding of Iraq, the
upcoming elimination or radical modification of major tax-based export
promotion programs, a dwindling global presence of U.S. citizens due
to fatal diseases and terrorism, and significant U.S. unemployment
rates. This Article concludes by reemphasizing the fact that
understanding U.S. international taxation in general, and the FEIE in
particular, requires that tax practitioners never stop posing the
question of utmost importance-why?

II.

OVERVIEW OF THE FOREIGN EARNED INCOME EXCLUSION

In the international context, countries generally base their
capacity to tax persons on either the source of the income or the
residence of the person who earns the income. In other words, in
determining whether a country has the power to impose a tax on a
particular item of income, a nation's tax system will focus on where
the income was earned or, alternatively, on the nationality of the
person earning the income. Under a source-based system (which is
also known as "territorial taxation"), a country taxes the income that
is earned within its borders, regardless of the nationality of the
person who earns it. By contrast, a residence-based system (which is
also known as "worldwide taxation") allows a country to tax the
income earned by its citizens or residents, irrespective of the country
in which it is earned. To the chagrin of many, the United States is
one of the few nations that utilizes a system of worldwide taxation.
Section 1 of the Code imposes a tax on the "taxable income" of every
individual. 2 The term "gross income," the base from which an
individual's taxable income is determined, encompasses "all income
from whatever source derived," including for services performed by
3
the individual.
Despite the apparent harshness of worldwide taxation, there are
exceptions that mitigate its severity. Among these exceptions is the
FEIE, a device that has been the target of dramatic modifications and
considerable controversy since its introduction in 1926. 4 As

2.
I.R.C. § 1 (1986).
3.
I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1986).
4.
For a detailed description of the evolution of the foreign earned income
exclusion, see Impact of U.S. Tax Rules on International Competitiveness: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. 126 (1999) (statement by
David Hamond, Executive Director, Section 911 Coalition) [hereinafter House Ways &
Means Hearing]; Jeffrey Evans, 911: The Foreign Earned Income Exclusion-Policy
and Enforcement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 891, 895-98 (1997); Glenn Kurlander, The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981: The Foreign Earned Income Exclusion: Redefining the
Exception for Amounts Paid by the United States Under I.R.C. § 911, 68 CORNELL L.
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mentioned above, the general rule is that the government taxes all of
the income that a U.S. person earns each year, regardless of whether
the income is derived from sources in the United States or
elsewhere. 5 Under the FEIE, however, U.S. taxpayers who live and
work abroad for extended periods of time are allowed to omit from
gross income $80,000 per year of certain types of income, as well as a
housing allowance. 6 In other words, the Code permits a "qualified
individual" to exclude from gross income for a given year "foreign
' 7
earned income" and "housing cost amount.
To be considered a "qualified individual" and thus eligible for the
FEIE, a person must meet two conditions. 8 First, that person must
have a "tax home" in a foreign country. 9 For purposes of the FEIE, a
person's tax home is the location of his or her regular or principal
place of business or, if the person has no regular or principal place of
business, then the location of that person's place of abode "in a real
and substantial sense."10 Second, the person must be a U.S. citizen
who is a bona fide resident of a foreign country for an entire year, a
resident alien who is a citizen of a foreign country with which the
United States has an income tax treaty in effect and who is a bona
fide resident of a foreign country for an entire year, or a U.S. citizen
or resident alien who is physically present in a foreign country for at
least 330 full days during the year.11
Provided that the person satisfies the definition of a "qualified
individual," that person may avoid being taxed on as much as $80,000
annually of "foreign earned income.' 2 The term "foreign earned
income" means income (in the form of wages, salaries, fees,

REV. 592, 594-97 (1983); Renee Judith Sobel, United States Taxation of Its Citizens
Abroad: Incentive or Equity, 38 VAND. L. REV. 101, 119-46 (1985).
5.
The FEIE is available both to qualified U.S. citizens and to resident aliens.
I.R.C. § 911(d)(1)(B) (1986).
6.
Id.
7.

§ 911(a).

8.
The FEIE does not apply to the salaries paid by the U.S. government. See
§ 911(b)(1)(B)(ii). The purpose of this policy is to prevent U.S. government employees
who are stationed abroad from obtaining a double benefit: exclusion from U.S. tax
under the FEIE and an exemption from foreign taxes based on the practice that
sovereigns will not tax employees of another sovereign. See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET
AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 377 (2d ed. 2001).

9.
§ 911(d)(1).
10.
Treas. Reg. § 1.911-2(b) (2004).
11.
§ 911(d)(1); see also Rev. Rul. 91-58, 1991-2 C.B. 340. This Ruling, which
relates to a citizen of the United Kingdom, expressly states that it applies to citizens of
all countries that have an income tax treaty with the United States. For the sake of
simplicity, U.S. citizens and resident aliens who meet one of these three tests are
occasionally referred to in this Article as "Americans."
12.
§ 911(b)(2)(D)(i). The excludable amounts have increased over the years, as
follows: 1998 - $72,000; 1999 - $74,000; 2000 - $76,000; 2001 - $78,000; 2002 - $80,000.

The $80,000 exclusion remains intact until 2008, at which time it will be increased in
proportion to the rate of inflation. See § 911(b)(2)(D)(ii).
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commissions, etc.) that a person receives as compensation for
performing personal services while overseas. 13 However, the term
"foreign earned income" does not include investment income
(dividends or interest), pension or annuity payments, or certain
14
deferred compensation.
In addition to excluding the foreign earned income, a qualified
individual may exclude each year from gross income the "housing cost
amount," which is the amount by which actual "housing expenses"
exceed a fixed figure that is intended to approximate the typical
housing costs of a person living in the United States. 15 The term
"housing expenses" includes the reasonable expenses paid during the
year by or on behalf of a qualified individual for housing in a foreign
16
country, as well as those of the individual's spouse and dependents.
The reasonable expenses may include rent, most utilities, real and
personal property insurance, occupancy taxes, nonrefundable security
deposits, furniture rental, household repairs, and residential
parking. 17 Reasonable housing expenses do not include, however, the
cost of items that are "lavish or extravagant under the
18
circumstances."

III.

RECENT ATTEMPTS TO REPEAL SECTION 911

The FEIE has been a catalyst for significant controversy since its
introduction nearly a century ago, with its opponents calling for
major modifications to, or the outright elimination of, this tax
program. 19 This clamor for change invariably intensifies at times
when the national budget seems imperiled. True to history, the FEIE
was recently attacked as the Bush Administration championed an
economic stimulus package based in tax reform. In particular, during
the legislative battle to devise the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and

13.

§ 911(b)(1)(A).

14.
§ 911(b)(1)(B); § 911(d)(2)(A).
15.
§ 911(c)(1). The "housing cost amount" is the excess of the taxpayer's
"housing expenses" for the year, divided by 16 percent of the annual salary of a U.S.
governmental employee at level GS- 14. For instance, if the annual salary of a person at
grade GS-14 is $70,000, then the housing cost amount is the excess of that person's
housing expenses over $11,200 (i.e., 16 percent of $70,000).
16.

§ 911(c)(2)(A).

17.
Treas. Reg. § 1.911-4(b)(1) (2004).
18.
§ 911(c)(2)(A).
19.
See e.g., Evans, supra note 4, at 916-17; Kurlander, supra note 4, at 613-15;
Sobel, supra note 4, at 155-58. See generally Yoseph Edrey & Adrienne Jeffrey,
Taxation of InternationalActivity: Over Relief from Double Taxation Under the U.S.
System, 9 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 101 (1991); Philip F. Postlewaite & Gregory E. Stern,
Innocents Abroad? The 1978 Foreign Earned Income Act and the Case for Its Repeal, 65
VA. L. REV. 1093 (1979).
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Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), the U.S. Senate approved a bill
that would have completely repealed the FEIE as of December 31,
2003.20 Along with numerous other changes to the existing
international tax provisions in the Code, revocation of the FEIE was
designed to counteract the $350 million in tax cuts contained
elsewhere in the economic stimulus legislation. 2 1 In other words, if
Congress was prepared to lower the amount of revenue that the U.S.
Treasury would collect in the future as a result of special depreciation
allowances, increased credits for certain taxpayers, and reduced tax
rates on particular capital gains and dividends found in the JGTRRA,
then it needed to craft methods by which to obtain more tax money
from other areas. The abolition of the FEIE was thus proposed. In the
end, this proposal did not survive the legislative process, and the
JGTRRA was enacted without revoking this longstanding tax benefit
22
to U.S. taxpayers working overseas.

IV. SUMMARY OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY

To comprehend the arguments made in support of and against
the FEIE, it is necessary to first have a basic understanding of the
policies that guide the United States in making decisions related to
international taxation. While general principles abound, some of the
primary goals of the international tax system include meeting the
revenue needs of the U.S. government in a fair and equitable manner,
minimizing tax compliance and administrative burdens by reducing
tax complexity, promoting economic efficiency through international
tax neutrality, and taking into account the competitive needs of U.S.
multinational businesses. 23 Each of these tax objectives is briefly
examined below.
A. Fairnessand Equity
The concepts of fairness and equity are paramount to the
credibility of the U.S. tax system because perceptions that revenue is
being raised unjustly or that certain persons are not paying their
share thanks to lobbying by special-interest groups lead to

20.
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003, 28 U.S.C. § 350
(2003); see also Johnathan Rickman & Herman Ayayo, U.S. Senate Keeps Foreign
Earned Income Exclusion Repeal, 2003 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 95-1 (May 16, 2003).
21.
Id.
22.
U.S. Senate & U.S. House of Rep., Managers'Statement and Explanationof
Final Tax Cut Bill, 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 101-40 (May 27, 2003).
23.
See GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 16-27; Donald C. Lubick, Remarks to
the Tax Executives Institute, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INcOME TAXATION 19-21

(2003).
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generalized noncompliance with tax laws and an unwillingness
voluntarily to report income and pay taxes. As high-ranking Treasury
Department officials explain, "When some taxpayers game the tax
system, the honest taxpayers who foot the bill lose confidence in the
'24
tax system and in the government.
To determine if certain tax provisions are fair, policy analysts
use two predominate measurements: horizontal equity and vertical
equity. The former requires that all U.S. taxpayers with equal
amounts of income bear equal tax burdens; that is, all persons who
earn essentially the same amount of income in a given year should be
obligated to pay the same amount in taxes. 25 The latter centers on the
fair allocation of the tax burden among U.S. taxpayers with different
levels of income and demands that each person pay an appropriate
amount of taxes. In the United States, the tax system is "progressive"
or "gradual," meaning that a person's income is subjected to higher
rates of taxation as that person earns more income. 26 This theory is
based on premise that a person's greater ability to pay makes it "fair"
to require that person to bear a larger portion of the country's overall
27
revenue needs.
B. Minimizing Tax Complexity and Tax Compliance Burdens
To say that the U.S. tax system is complicated would be a
tremendous understatement. Indeed, as one commentator accurately
puts it, "Some problems are so complex that you have to be highly
intelligent and well informed just to be undecided about them. '28 The
international tax rules constitute perhaps the most perplexing
provisions in the Code for several reasons. First, many of the tax
provisions are designed to implement some economic or political
policy other than raising revenue. 29 In addition, transactions in the
international arena are apt to be quite complicated by themselves,

24.
Pamela F. Olson, New Partnership Will Restore Faith in Tax System, Olson
Says, 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 180-13 (Sept. 17, 2003). Ms. Olson is the Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Treasury Department.
25.
GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 23.
26.
I.R.C. § 1 (1986); see also MICHAEL J. MCINTYRE, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL
INCOME TA RULES OF THE UNITED STATES 1-9 (2d ed. 1992). This author explains that

the concept of vertical equity generally means that "the poor should be exempt from tax
and that the rich should pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes than members
of the middle class." Id.
27.
U.S. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX RULES:
BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO THE COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S.
BUSINESSES ABROAD, PUB. NO. JCX-68-03, at 3 (2003).

28.
Ron Pearlman, Transition Issues in Moving to a Consumption Tax: A Tax
Lawyer's Perspective,in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 393 (Henry
J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996).
29.
GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 24.
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even before applying any tax rules. 30 Finally, the United States has
adopted international tax rules over time on the basis of competing,
often radically inconsistent, policies. 31 This complexity is damaging to
the U.S. economy because it increases the cost of tax compliance for
taxpayers, obligates the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to spend
additional funds on tax enforcement, and encourages taxpayers to
engage in considerable amounts of tax planning. 32 These heightened
tax-related expenses result in elevated prices of U.S. goods and
services in the international market, thereby making U.S. citizens
less competitive in the international trade context. 33 In light of these
negative consequences, tax experts argue that "simplification of the
international tax provisions should be a serious goal of tax policy
34
analysts.
C. Economic Efficiency and InternationalTax Neutrality
Instituting tax policies that maximize global economic welfare is
the "best way" to maximize U.S. economic welfare. 35 A recent study
by the U.S. Treasury Department indicates that it is unadvisable for
the United States to establish tax policies that produce short-term
national benefit at the expense of worldwide financial well-being
because doing so would certainly precipitate tit-for-tat retaliation by
other nations. 36 This study warns, moreover, that a "broad global
view" is especially important for countries, like the United States,
characterized by open economies and substantial inbound and
37
outbound investment.
The movement of money and other assets across borders in
response to tax policies, instead of in response to economic
fundamentals, causes a reduction in global economic welfare. In other
words, tax rules that serve to distort where capital is located are
detrimental to the worldwide economy. 38 The type of economic
distortion depends on a country's system of taxing international
investment. On one hand, if a pure source-based system is used (i.e.,
a territorial taxation whereby a country taxes only the income that is
earned within its borders), then capital would naturally be
transferred to the country with the lowest tax rate instead of flowing

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.

35.
U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S.
CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A POLICY STUDY 25 (2000), available at

http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/subpartf.pdf.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.

U.S. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 27, at 17-18.
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to investment projects that would render higher pre-tax profits. On
the other hand, if a pure residence-based system is used (worldwide
taxation whereby a country taxes the income earned by its residents
irrespective of the country in which it is earned), then business
enterprises located in low-tax countries would likely attract more
capital investment or increase their global market share because of
their ability to offer lower prices than business competitors located in
high-tax countries, even though the latter may be more economically
39
efficient.
As one may suspect, there is no consensus regarding which
method of taxing income best minimizes distortions in the location of
capital investment in a world, like ours, where nearly every country
imposes a different tax rate. 40 However, two main approaches for
achieving international tax neutrality have emerged: capital export
41
neutrality and capital import neutrality.
The goal of capital export neutrality is reached when U.S.
persons pay the same total amount of tax on income from foreign
sources (to the foreign government or the U.S. government) as they
pay on their income from U.S. sources (to the U.S. government).
Stated differently, U.S. persons pay the same amount of tax on all
income, irrespective of where it is earned. As a result, the decisions of
where to invest, in what countries to build manufacturing plants, and
how to structure business transactions should not be influenced by
taxes. 4 2 The idea that capital export neutrality should be a
foundation of U.S. international tax policy was initially espoused by
the Kennedy Administration in 1962, 43 and the U.S. Treasury
Department has demonstrated its support of capital export neutrality
44
as recently as the year 2000.

39.
40.

Id.
Id.

41.
U.S. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PUB. No. JCX-13-99, OVERVIEW OF
PRESENT-LAw RULES AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (1999),

available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x.13.99.htm. This study clarifies that "[tihe
literature on the theory of international taxation provides no clear direction as to the
better of the two principles." Id. § IV.D.
42.
GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 16-17.
43.

MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION

25-26 (2003).
44.

U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 35, at 53 (providing that

a "basic

economic analysis indicates that capital export neutrality is probably the best policy for
promoting economic efficiency in a tax system that includes taxes on income of
capital"); see also U.S. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 41, at 26 (acknowledging
that, in a world of unequal tax rates in various nations, it is impossible to accomplish
both capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality). This latter study further
recognizes that while there is no consensus with regard to which system is preferable
from the perspective of global economic efficiency, the U.S. Treasury Department has
historically championed capital export neutrality. Id.
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The concept of capital import neutrality dictates that all firms
operating in the same industry in a particular country, regardless of
whether they are owned by local parties or foreigners, are taxed at
the same level. 4 5 In other words, under this system of neutrality,
investment income derived in each country is subjected to the same
tax rate irrespective of the residence of the investor. Capital import
neutrality is accomplished where the investor's country of residence
completely exempts from taxation income earned in foreign countries,
thereby allowing only the country in which the income originates to
levy a tax. 46 U.S. multinational businesses advocate this standard,
arguing that all, not just some, of their foreign-source income should
be exempt from taxation by the U.S. government in order to make
47
their operations abroad competitive with local rivals.
D. Promotingthe Competitiveness of U.S. MultinationalBusinesses
Policymakers, business groups, and economists have argued for
many years that increasing the international competitiveness of the
U.S. economy should be a major tax policy goal.48 This urgency is
primarily based on certain trends during the last two decades,
including large U.S. trade deficits, increased foreign investment in
the United States, low national savings rates, and corporate
49
transactions resulting in the expatriation of U.S. businesses.
Although definitions of "competitiveness" vary, in the commercial
context, this term refers to the ability of U.S. multinational
businesses that locate production facilities in other countries to
compete in foreign markets. 50 In particular, the idea of
competitiveness often focuses on the after-tax profitability of
51
investment in foreign production.

V. VIOLATIONS OF U.S. TAX POLICY BY SECTION 911

Champions of the FEIE maintain that Section 911 is consistent
with the components of U.S. international tax policy described above.
An analysis of these arguments, as well as the evidence on which
such arguments are based, renders a contrary conclusion. Provided
below is a critique of the principal claims regarding the FEIE.

45.
46.

GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 17.
U.S. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 27, at 20.

47.
48.

GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 17.
U.S. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 27, at 16.

49.
50.
51.

Id.

Id. at 17.
Id.

738

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37.:727

A. Fairnessand Equity
The U.S. income tax system is predicated on the notion that
individual enrichment is the best method of measuring a taxpayer's
ability to bear the costs of the federal government.52 A taxpayer's
gross income provides some indication of that person's annual
enrichment, but it would be unfair to utilize this figure as the
guidepost for assessing taxes for the following reason. An attorney
who earns $100,000 in annual fees would actually derive less overall
economic benefit since such work necessarily requires the attorney to
incur many expenses in the process, including those for office space,
employees' salaries, insurance, parking, professional memberships,
research, and travel.5 3 Determining the annual enrichment of the
attorney requires that the expenses first be deducted from the
receipts, thus rendering the attorney's net income, which is
considered the "only suitable measure of the taxpayer's 'income'
properly so-called. ' 54 This idea is codified in Section 162 of the Code,
which provides that taxpayers may take deductions for all "ordinary
and necessary expenses" that they paid or incurred during a year in
the process of carrying on any trade or business. Based on the
personal enrichment concept, taxpayers are allowed to take
55
deductions for a variety of other reasons, too.
Proponents of the FEIE rely on the net income theory in arguing
that U.S. taxpayers abroad should not be taxed on the portion of their
income that reasonably reflects the added costs of working abroad,
such as those associated with foreign housing, education of children
in private English-speaking institutions, home-leave expenses, and
56
maintaining storage or housing in the United States while overseas.
In other words, they argue that, were it not for the FEIE, U.S.
taxpayers abroad would end up paying higher taxes than their
compatriots working in the United States since they have larger gross
incomes as a result of the international-assignment allowances (costof-living adjustments) that they receive from their multinational
employers.5 7 This argument has also appeared in congressional
debates, such as when the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S.
House of Representatives stated the following:

52.
53.

MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 101 (9th ed. 2002).
Id.

54.
55.
56.

Id.
See I.R.C. §§ 161-223 (1986).
See House Ways & Means Hearing,supra note 4; see also U.S. JOINT COMM.

ON TAXATION, supra note 27.
57.
PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP, ECONOMIC POLICY CONSULTING SERVICES,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN EARNED INCOME EXCLUSION E-6 (Oct. 1995).
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The Committee recognizes that for U.S. businesses to be effective
competitors overseas it is necessary to dispatch U.S. citizens or
residents to sites of foreign operations. Being stationed abroad typically
imposes additional financial burdens on the employee and his family.
These burdens may arise from maintaining two homes (one in the
United States and one abroad), additional personal travel to maintain
family ties, or the added expenses of living in a foreign location that has
a high cost of living. Businesses often remunerate their employees for
these additional burdens by paying higher wages. Because the
increased remuneration is offset by larger burdens, the remuneration
does not truly reflect an increase in economic well-being. The
Committee, therefore, believes that the exclusion of section 911 is a
simple way to prevent taxpayers from facing an increased tax burden
when there has been no increase in economic well-being by accepting an
58
overseas assignment.

When U.S. multinationals operate abroad, they may generally
choose to hire people from three groups: U.S. expatriates (for
example, Americans working in Chile), third-country nationals (for
example, Canadians working in Chile), or locals (for example,
Chileans working in Chile). In addition to the net income argument
described in the preceding paragraph, FEIE backers suggest that the
concept of tax fairness should involve a comparison between U.S.
expatriates and the third-country nationals working in a particular
foreign nation, as opposed to a comparison between U.S. taxpayers
abroad and their domestic counterparts. 59 Since third-country
nationals are generally not taxed on their foreign-source income
(because their countries apply a territorial taxation system under
which income earned abroad is not subject to income tax at home)
while U.S. taxpayers are taxed on their worldwide income, FEIE
supporters claim that the only way to institute equity is to enlarge
the FEIE such that all of the income earned by U.S. taxpayers abroad
60
is exempt from taxation.
As explained above, the concept of tax fairness encompasses the
theories of horizontal equity and vertical equity. Opponents of the
FEIE argue that this program should be completely repealed because
it violates both horizontal and vertical equity. 61 With regard to
horizontal equity, this principle is violated because the FEIE removes
an item of income (the "foreign earned income") from the U.S. tax
base, thereby allowing U.S. taxpayers with similar amounts of income
to bear different tax burdens. 62 Moreover, the FEIE does not comport
with the notion of horizontal equity because it provides a tax benefit

58.

Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1997, H.R. REP. NO. 105-148 (1997).

59.

John A. Papahronis, Taxation of Americans Abroad Under the ERTA: An

Unnecessary Windfall, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 586, 593-94 (1982).
60.
Id. at 594.
61.
GUSTAFSON ET AL., supranote 8, at 371.
62.
Id. at 373; see also MCINTYRE, supra note 26, at 7-27 to 7-29 (explaining
that the FEIE has been a favorite target for tax reformers for many years since it is an
"obvious violation of horizontal equity").

740

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37727

to U.S. taxpayers working abroad in a manner that bears no
relationship to any hardship that supposedly impairs a taxpayer's
ability to pay. Allowing qualified U.S. citizens abroad a flat exclusion
of $80,000 per year ignores the possibility that many U.S. taxpayers
living and working in the United States (such as those in Alaska or
Hawaii) may experience higher costs of living. Unlike their expatriate
brethren, however, the Alaskan and Hawaiian workers do not qualify
for any tax benefits under the FEIE. 63 This flat exclusion amount also
yields inequity when comparing U.S. citizens working in different
foreign countries since the cost of living in the Dominican Republic is
quite low, whereas living expenses in parts of Europe are exorbitant.
Despite these disparities, qualified U.S. citizens working and living in
each of these nations will be able to exclude $80,000 (plus their
64
"housing cost amount") from their annual income under the FEIE.
The FEIE also constitutes a transgression of vertical equity since
it affords a greater benefit to highly-compensated individuals. Section
911 provides that the total exclusion from gross income (for the
"foreign earned income" and "housing cost amount") may not exceed
the amount of a person's "foreign earned income" for the year. 65 This
limitation produces certain inequitable results. For example, assume
that a U.S. citizen overseas receives from his or her employer
$100,000 in wages and $50,000 for housing expenses. Under the
FEIE, the person would be able to exclude $80,000 of the wages, but
only $20,000 of the housing expenses. By contrast, a U.S. citizen
abroad who receives $150,000 in wages and $50,000 for housing
expenses would be able to exclude $80,000 of the wages and the entire
$50,000.66
Finally, the idea presented by FEIE backers that determining
tax fairness should not involve a comparison between U.S. taxpayers
abroad and their domestic counterparts, but rather between U.S.
citizens and the third-country nationals working in a particular
foreign nation also lacks merit for two main reasons. First, since
third-country nationals do not enjoy the benefits of U.S. citizenship
they naturally do not bear the costs for them. 6 7 Second, the situation
between third-country nationals and U.S. citizens abroad may not be
sufficiently similar to make a comparison of tax benefits and
burdens. 68 For example, although the third-country nationals may be
exempt from tax in their home countries, they ordinarily must satisfy
various requirements to benefit from this exempt status, including

63.
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.

Papahronis, supra note 59, at 593.
Id.
I.R.C. § 911(d)(7) (1986).
U.S. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 27,
Papahronis, supra note 59, at 594.
Id.

§ VI.C.
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living and working abroad continuously for at least two years, being
accompanied by an immediate family member, formally relinquishing
residence in their home countries, and severing other ties such as
69
property ownership and financial interests.
B. Minimizing Tax Complexity and Tax Compliance Burdens
As mentioned above, one of the United States' primary
international tax goals is to minimize tax complexity, thereby
reducing the expense of tax compliance (for U.S. taxpayers) and of tax
enforcement (for the IRS). Proponents of the FEIE claim that
complexity in the U.S. tax laws is itself a disguised tax levied in the
form of additional hours that a taxpayer must spend to properly
complete the relevant tax forms and the fees that taxpayers often pay
to professional tax preparers. 70 They further suggest that complexity
is equally detrimental to the IRS, which must allocate considerable
public resources to process tax and information returns, conduct
examinations and audits, impose tax assessments, and handle the
resulting litigation and appeals. 71 Succinctly put in one recent study,
"[clomplexity is very poor tax policy, indeed, as it imposes costs on
taxpayers and on the budget and produces no revenue for the
government. '72 Supporters of Section 911 acknowledge that earlier
designs of the FEIE were desirable in theory but "disastrous" in
application; however, they argue that the current structure and
function of the FEIE achieves greater tax simplicity. 7 3 Echoing this
sentiment, other FEIE backers claim that Section 911 simplifies the
tax deductions associated with doing business abroad.7 4 Still other
champions of the FEIE suggest that using Section 911 often
eliminates the need to compute the foreign tax credit, which
constitutes an extremely complex undertaking for less sophisticated
taxpayers working abroad, such as rank-and-file employees and
middle managers of small and medium-sized business. 75
There is little argument that excessive complexity is negative for
taxpayers and the IRS alike. The FEIE's ability to lessen tax
complexity, however, is questionable. Indeed, it is evident that
Section 911 serves to make the already-complicated U.S.

69.
Id. According to the author, "[w]hile a comparison of relative tax burdens of
expatriate Americans vis-a-vis third country nationals may have some relevance in a
trade promotion context, the comparison is inappropriate when applied to tax equity."

Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
Charles E.

PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP, supra note 57, at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
House Ways & Means Hearing,supra note 4, at 124.
Letter from American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to Senator
Grassley (May 14, 2003), available at http://www.aicpa.org.
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international tax system even more complex, and makes tax
compliance and enforcement more challenging for taxpayers, U.S.
courts, and the IRS. 76 As explained above, to take advantage of the
FEIE, a taxpayer must undertake a variety of formidable tasks,
including satisfying all of the fact-specific tests to be considered a
"qualified individual," identifying and calculating the items that
constitute "foreign earned income," determining the expenses falling
within the definition of the "housing cost amount," completing the
appropriate forms officially to make the election to benefit from the
FEIE, and avoiding the plethora of additional restrictions related to
the FEIE. 77 In addition, after expending all the effort to take
advantage of the FEIE, many U.S. taxpayers overseas must then
invest a significant amount of time and resources to obtain the proper
foreign tax credit. 78 As described earlier, the FEIE is not unlimited;
rather, it allows qualified taxpayers to avoid being taxed by the IRS
on as much as $80,000 of their annual foreign earned income.7 9 To
address the issue of how the IRS handles any foreign taxes paid on
any income above this threshold, the taxpayer must apply the rules
regarding the foreign tax credit.80 Like those of the FEIE, the
requirements and rules associated with the foreign tax credit are
extremely complex. 81 These conclusions are supported by a report
from the U.S. General Accounting Office, which concluded that the
FEIE is unreasonably complex, many U.S. taxpayers overseas are
unable accurately to prepare their own tax returns, many U.S.
companies incur substantial costs for the preparation of the tax

Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to ProgressiveReform of the
76.
U.S. InternationalIncome Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 1009 (1997); see also
GuSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 373 (suggesting that the FEIE makes the tax
system more complex not just for U.S. taxpayers, but also for U.S. courts, which are
charged with interpreting the complexities, and the IRS, which is responsible for
administering them).
Peroni, supra note 76, at 1009; see also I.R.S. Form 2555 (Foreign Earned
77.
Income); I.R.S. Instructions for Form 2555; I.R.S. Pub. 54: Tax Guide for U.S. Citizens
and Resident Aliens Abroad (2002); I.R.S. Form 673 (Statement for Claiming Benefits
Provided by Section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code).
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: NONFILING AMONG U.S.
78.
CITIZENS ABROAD, GGD-98-106, at 24 (May 1998) (finding that those Americans abroad

who elected to use the FEIE and the foreign tax credit still had an average U.S. tax
liability of $6,700).
79.
I.R.C. § 911(b)(2)(D)(i). The excludable amounts have increased over the
years, as follows: 1998 - $72,000; 1999 - $74,000; 2000 - $76,000; 2001 - $78,000; 2002 $80,000. The $80,000 exclusion remains intact until 2008, at which time is increased in
proportion to the rate of inflation. See §91 1(b)(2)(D)(ii).
80.
No exclusion, deduction or credit is allowed to the extent that it is properly
allocable to or chargeable against amounts excluded from gross income under the
FEIE. §911(d)(6).
81.
I.R.C. §§ 901-08.
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returns of their employees, and the risk of incorrect completion of tax
82
and information returns is great.
C. Economic Efficiency and InternationalTax Neutrality
As explained earlier in the Article, capital export neutrality is
achieved when a U.S. person pays the same amount of tax on all
income, irrespective of where it is earned. The decision of whether to
invest in the United States or abroad, therefore, is based on non-tax
business considerations. 83 The idea that capital export neutrality
serves as a foundation of U.S. international tax policy was first
8 5
introduced in 196284 and still enjoys strong governmental support.
In fact, a recent study by the U.S. Treasury Department concluded
that "basic economic analysis indicates that capital export neutrality
'86
is probably the best policy for promoting economic efficiency.
Attempts by FEIE supporters to justify this program on the basis
that it meets the concept of capital export neutrality are noticeably
scarce. Moreover, of the few arguments that they have espoused, most
are perplexing or downright self-defeating. From this, one may
speculate that FEIE backers are willing to concede that Section 911
violates capital export neutrality since this divergence from U.S.
international tax policy is arguably not fatal in light of the
"conflicting policy objectives" in this area. 87 For example,
representatives of the Section 911 Coalition focus on the idea of
economic efficiency, suggesting that U.S. tax law should not interfere
with the efficient allocation of resources.8 8 According to studies
sponsored by this organization, without Section 911, U.S. taxpayers
abroad would generally pay considerably higher taxes than their
domestic counterparts, and their multinational employers would bear
a large portion of these added tax costs.8 9 As a result, were the FEIE
to be repealed, federal tax law would serve to discourage U.S.
multinationals from hiring U.S. citizens for overseas projects. 90

82.

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT ABROAD DISCOURAGED

BY U.S. INCOME TAX LAws, ID 81-29, 3 (Feb. 1981) [hereinafter AMERICAN
EMPLOYMENT]. These conclusions were based on the functioning of earlier versions of
the FEIE.
83.

GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 16-17.

84.

GRAETZ, supranote 43, at 25-26.

85.

U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 35, at 53.

86.
Id.
87.
AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT, supra note 82, at iv. According to this report,
whether and how to tax Americans working abroad is part of the "continuing conflict
among the tax policy objectives of raising revenue, achieving tax equity, simplifying tax
returns, and other special aims of public policy, such as promoting U.S. exports and
competitiveness [of U.S. multinationals] abroad. Id.
88.
House Ways & Means Hearing,supra note 4, at 2.
89.
PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP, supra note 57, at E-6-E-7.
90.

Id
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Concurring with the idea that revoking Section 911 would alter
investment and other business decisions of U.S. multinationals,
respected tax experts harshly criticize the FEIE, labeling it "an
example of a tax preference provision in the U.S. international tax
system that distorts economic behavior in violation of capital export
neutrality."9 1 This transgression of tax policy occurs on two levels.
First, with respect to individual U.S. taxpayers working abroad,
Section 911 distorts economic and social behavior-thereby making it
inefficient-by encouraging them to decide where to live and work
based in large part on tax considerations. Put differently, the FEIE
manipulates international labor flows by providing an incentive to
mobile U.S. workers to relocate to nations that impose few, if any,
92
income taxes in order to reduce their worldwide tax liabilities.
Second, with regard to U.S. multinational companies, Section 911
acts as a subsidy to the companies themselves, rather than to the
U.S. employees thereof, to the extent that this program allows the
companies to lower the workers' salaries. This encourages U.S.
multinationals to locate their operations in low-tax countries, which
93
violates capital export neutrality.
D. Promoting the Competitiveness of U.S. MultinationalBusinesses
At first glance, Section 911 appears to benefit individual U.S.
taxpayers working overseas. In reality, however, large U.S.
multinationals are usually the beneficiaries of this program.
Proponents of the FEIE explain the situation in the following
manner. The foreign tax burdens and extra living costs for U.S.
taxpayers abroad make it more expensive for U.S. multinationals to
hire U.S. employees. If the companies employ U.S. citizens, they must
ordinarily reimburse these workers for the additional taxes (through
so-called "tax neutralization programs") and for the added living costs
(through higher salaries). These expenses incurred by the U.S.
company are then passed on to customers worldwide in the form of
higher product prices. As a result of these elevated prices, U.S.
multinationals are unable to compete with their foreign competitors

91.
Peroni, supra note 76, at 1008; see also GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at
372.
92.
Id.; see also GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 372 (stating that the FEIE
"may distort the workings of the free market by causing [Americans] to accept overseas
employment in situations in which they would not have done so in the absence of this
tax preference").
93.
Peroni, supra note 76, at 1008; see also GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at
372 (suggesting that we question why the U.S. tax system should provide a tax subsidy
to U.S. multinational businesses that leads to an understatement of the actual costs of
operating overseas, thereby encouraging these businesses to relocate operations abroad
in what is a patent violation of capital export neutrality).
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from countries that exempt the foreign earned income of their citizens
since these foreign rivals can charge lower prices for comparable
products. 94 This argument centers on the competitiveness of U.S.
businesses in the global market and recognizes that in most cases
"the ultimate beneficiaries of the Section 911 exclusion are the
employers of the U.S. worker, who are able to pay lower total
compensation to the U.S. worker than if the exclusion were not
95
available."
The competitiveness justification has also been a traditional
favorite among certain politicians. For instance, in analyzing the
FEIE in 1981, congressional reports stated:
American business faces increasing competitive pressures abroad, and
[] in view of the nation's continuing trade deficits, it is important to
allow Americans working overseas to contribute to the effort to keep
American business competitive. The tax burdens imposed on these
individuals . . . have made it difficult for U.S. businesses to utilize
American employees abroad. In many cases, the policy of these
businesses is to make their employees whole for any extra tax expenses
[that] the employees incur because of overseas transfers. Thus, an extra
tax cost to the employees becomes a cost to the business, which cost
often must be passed through to customers in the form of higher prices.
In intensely competitive industries, such as construction, this leads to
higher, and thus often noncompetitive bids for work by American firms
. . .As a result, some U.S. companies either have to cut back their
foreign operations or have replaced American citizens in key executive
96
positions with foreign nationals.

The importance of competitiveness as a rationale for the tax
break provided (albeit indirectly) to U.S. multinationals is also
recognized in numerous other sources, which have called this
argument the "main justification" for the FEIE, 9 7 the "primary
purpose" of this tax provision, 98 one of "the relatively few policy
instruments available for promoting U.S. exports and commercial
competitiveness abroad,"99 and the "driving force" behind preserving
Section 911.10

94.
GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 371; see also House Ways & Means
Hearing,supra note 4,at 126. This organization claims that U.S. multinationals face a
dilemma: pay U.S. workers more than foreigners with comparable qualifications or
utilize a tax-equalization program to compensate U.S. workers for the additional tax
burden. Either way, this group argues, U.S. businesses will face an increased financial
burden, one which "many employers are unwilling to accept even if the American
worker is more productive and has better professional qualifications." Id.
95.
GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 371.
96.
S.REP. No. 97-144, at 35-36 (1981), reprintedin 1981-2 C.B. 412, 419-20.
97.
PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP, supra note 57, at 31.
98.
MCINTYRE, supra note 26, at 7-27.
99.
AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT, supra note 82, at 35.
100.
Evans, supra note 4, at 900; see also Martin A. Sullivan, The Five Uneasy
Pieces of U.S. International Tax Reform, 31 TAX NOTES INT'L 418, 422 (2003)
(explaining that "[flor decades, well-funded multinationals and their highly
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Simultaneously safeguarding the competitiveness of U.S.
multinationals (by providing an indirect tax subsidy to these
businesses) and achieving capital export neutrality (where the
decision to operate in the United States or abroad is not made on the
basis of tax considerations) appears impossible. Indeed, the concepts
themselves seem to stand in obvious contradiction. Instead of simply
admitting that favoring particular U.S. citizens abroad is incongruent
with accepted international tax policy, the U.S. government justifies
this favoritism by explaining that its entire international tax policy is
inconsistent. Studies by the U.S. Government Accounting Office
explain,
Taxation of Americans working abroad is part of the continuing conflict
among the tax policy objectives of raising revenue, achieving tax equity,
simplifying tax returns, and other special aims of public policy, such as
promoting U.S. exports and competitiveness [of U.S. multinationals]
abroad. In considering the question of whether, and to what extent,
Americans working abroad should be taxed, the Congress must decide
what priority should be assigned to each of the conflicting policy
10 1
objectives.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that subsidizing U.S.
multinationals falls within accepted national tax policy, this practice
is still suspect since its overall value to the U.S. economy is still
unsubstantiated. 10 2 In the opinion of tax experts, Congress has
historically rationalized the special tax treatment of U.S. taxpayers
abroad on a variety of bases, but the "only real justification" for
Section 911 is that it is an incentive. 10 3 Accordingly, the evaluation of
the FEIE should focus exclusively on the economic effectiveness of
this tax regime; that is, whether it has generated more national
benefits than it has cost the U.S. Treasury in terms of lost tax
revenues. Many studies regarding the economic effects of the FEIE
have been conducted by both governmental agencies and the private
sector.10 4 Despite these efforts, the true monetary virtue of the FEIE
remains "unproven," which is quite disconcerting in light of the

compensated lobbyists have take advantage of America's apprehensions about its own
competitiveness and used it to promote their own self-interests").
101.
AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT, supra note 82, at 28.
102.
Evans, supra note 4, at 900-06 (arguing that even if Section 911 achieves
its stated goals, the key question is whether the U.S. economy as a whole is better off
with or without this provision). In short, Evans recognizes the laudable aspirations of
the FEIE, but questions whether any have truly been achieved. Id. at 916; see also
Papahronis, supra note 59, at 586.
103.
Sobel, supra note 4, at 146.
104.
Id. at 150-56 (referring to studies by the U.S. Treasury Department, the
U.S. General Accounting Office, and Chase Econometrics).
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magnitude of this
05
companies.'

subsidy

for

particular

U.S.

multinational

E. Tax Benefit Concept
This Article explained earlier that one of the chief goals of the
U.S. international tax system is to promote fairness. A subcategory of
fairness is the tax benefit concept, which basically means that there
should exist a reasonable relationship between the amount of tax that
one pays and the measure of governmental benefits that one receives
in return. Advocates of the FEIE claim that this program makes
logical adjustments for the fact that U.S. citizens working abroad
receive fewer benefits in terms of U.S. government goods and services
06
than their counterparts who reside and work in the United States.
They argue, in particular, that "Americans living abroad do not
receive the same level of benefits from the U.S. government as
domestic residents. Thus, if the [tax] benefits principle were applied,
Americans working abroad should be subject to lower U.S. income
07
taxes."1
While this argument may have some immediate allure, further
analysis clearly reveals its shortcomings.108 The FEIE violates the tax
benefits principle, and thus is unfair and in violation of accepted U.S.
international tax policy, because it allows U.S. workers working
abroad to retain the tremendous (yet often unappreciated) benefits of
U.S. citizenship without paying their share of the costs of providing
these benefits. 10 9 This argument is based on the fact that U.S.
citizenship offers enormous benefits regardless of where a citizen
resides and works. For instance, irrespective of where a citizen
currently works, that person is deriving certain benefits from U.S.
government
expenditures
on
foreign
affairs, international
development assistance, and national defense. 110 Any U.S. citizen
who has traveled abroad and required assistance from a U.S.
embassy or local consulate can surely appreciate this argument.
Those citizens who have been defended or evacuated by the U.S.
armed forces in hostile countries will clearly understand this
argument, too. More importantly perhaps, U.S. citizenship provides
one with the ability (priceless in many cases) to return to the United

105.
conducted
FEIE "has
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 156 (urging a moratorium on Section 911 until reliable studies are
since inadequate information regarding the overall economic effect of the
hindered effective policymaking for more than fifty years").
PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP, supra note 57, at E-6.
Id. at 28.
JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 189 (2000) (describing the

FEIE as a "windfall" and suggesting that most claims in support of the FEIE, including
the tax benefits argument, lack merit).
109.
Peroni, supra note 76, at 1009.
110.
Id.
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States to take advantage of the existing legal, economic, and social
institutions. 111 In short, the FEIE allows certain U.S. taxpayers to be
"free riders" with respect to the vast array of benefits, both apparent
112
and obscure, provided by the U.S. government.
F. Cultural Ambassadors
Supporters of the FEIE claim that the mere presence of citizens
abroad promotes U.S. interests because they "foster a positive image"
of the United States the world over 13 and serve as "unpaid
ambassadors for American values."1 14 This favorable impression, they
argue, is created by all U.S. citizens overseas, regardless of whether
they are employees of major corporations, representatives of cultural
or religious institutions, educators, entrepreneurs, directors of
115
charitable organizations, or homemakers.
Evoking patriotism and exploiting the inherent desire of most
citizens to propagate U.S. culture and values can be effective
techniques, particularly in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001. However, in the context of the FEIE, these
tactics are undercut by the fact that little, if any, tangible evidence
exists to support the sweeping assertion that all U.S. citizens abroad
will foster a positive U.S. image or enhance international goodwill
and increased understanding between nations and people. 1 16
Moreover, even a cursory review of major newspapers will indicate
that certainly not all U.S. citizens abroad are fostering a positive
image of the United States. For instance, an eighteen year-old U.S.
dependent living in Singapore was the focus of worldwide media in
1994 when he was arrested, interrogated, imprisoned, fined, and
caned for stealing Singaporean street signs and spray-painting over
fifty cars. 117 This event undoubtedly tarnished the U.S. image since
this youngster represented "a modern-day Ugly American, a
stereotypical expatriate kid reviled in the Singaporean media as a

111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
House Ways & Means Hearing,supra note 4, at 131.
114.
Democrats Abroad Join Opposition to Elimination of Foreign Earned
Income Exclusion Perceive Threat to Hundreds of Thousands of Jobs for Americans
Living and Working Overseas, 2003 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 98-11 (May 21, 2003)
(statement by Senator John Breaux) [hereinafter Democrats Abroad].
115.
House Ways & Means Hearing, supra note 4, at 131; see also U.S. JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 27, § VI.C.
116.
Evans, supra note 4, at 904.
117.
Jason Vest, Justice under the Lash; Did Singapore Beat a Confession out of
a Young American?, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1994, at D1.
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foreign vandal."1 18 Another incident involving U.S. expatriates that
filled newspaper headlines and created a negative perception of the
United States occurred in Brunei in 1995. In this case, an U.S.
corporate jet pilot living abroad was charged by the Brunei
authorities with reckless driving and attempted murder after he
engaged in a high-speed car chase with U.S. embassy officials, who
were assisting the pilot's wife and daughter escape domestic
violence. 119
G. Increase U.S. Exports and Domestic Jobs
In an attempt to simplify a deceptively convoluted argument,
proponents of the FEIE offer the following formula:
U.S. citizens abroad = U.S. exports = domestic jobs.

120

The logic underlying this argument is that the FEIE causes U.S.
multinational business operating abroad to hire U.S. workers, who
will purchase supplies from and retain the services of other U.S.
companies. This, in turn, will generate a higher demand for U.S.
exports, thereby creating more domestic jobs. In support of this
position, FEIE backers cite two 1995 studies. According to a study by
academics at the Johns Hopkins University, U.S. citizens employed
overseas are more likely to order goods and services from other U.S.
companies. 121 Likewise, the report by PriceWaterhouse alludes to an
earlier study by the U.S. Treasury Department in concluding that the
repeal of the FEIE would cause the number of U.S. taxpayers
working abroad to decrease by 2.83 percent, the amount of U.S.
exports to diminish by 1.89 percent, and the total domestic
employment associated with U.S. exports to fall by nearly two
percent. 122 In other words, abrogating the FEIE would occasion a
loss of 6,800 jobs abroad, an $8.7 billion drop in U.S. exports, and the
123
disappearance of 143,000 domestic jobs in the export sector.
Certain Washington-based conservative think tanks have also

Id. As an executive for Federal Express in Singapore, it is quite possible
118.
that the young man's parents (as well as the young man himself indirectly) benefited
from the FEIE.
Jack Horan, Charlottean's Kin May Face Caning in Brunei; Pilot, U.S.
119.
Embassy Dispute Car Chase, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 29, 1995, at IA.
House Ways & Means Hearing, supra note 4, at 133 (arguing that Section
120.
911 paves "the way for more U.S. citizens overseas to buy American, sell American,
specify American, hire American, and create opportunities for other Americans abroad")
(emphasis in original).
121.
Report by Charles Pearson & James Riedel to the Section 911 Coalition,
The Importance of Section 911 for U.S. International Competitiveness § I (Aug. 1995).
PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP, supra note 57, at E-6 (on file with the author)
122.
[hereinafter Pearson & Reidel].
123.
Id.
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supported this argument. According to the Heritage Foundation,
ridding the U.S. tax system of the FEIE would increase the cost for
U.S. multinational businesses of hiring U.S. citizens, thereby making
the hiring of foreigners more probable. 124 This, it is argued, will
result in fewer U.S. exports since U.S. citizens working abroad,
particularly company executives, "are likely to purchase U.S.
products."'12 5 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
has also made similar statements. In a recent letter to Congress, this
professional organization warned that if U.S. multinationals
substitute foreigners for U.S. workers at their foreign operations, the
result will be decreased domestic employment and U.S. exports
because "foreign nationals are less likely to purchase U.S. goods and
services because they are more familiar with their local suppliers.' 12 6
The formula offered by FEIE proponents possesses a certain
degree of persuasiveness. However, this theory may be discredited in
several ways. First, the modern world is characterized by global
travel, satellite television, cellular telephones with worldwide
coverage, and the Internet. As a result, most U.S. citizens are exposed
to an abundance of different ideas, products and services, all of which
are readily accessible. In terms of business, the modern world is
characterized by ever-increasing competition where price and quality
are normally the determinative factors. Therefore, accepting the
premise of FEIE supporters that U.S. citizens abroad will
automatically purchase goods and services from U.S. companies is
troublesome. Indeed, do U.S. workers truly prefer U.S. products?
Think about Americans' penchant for French wine, Italian clothing,
German luxury cars, and Swiss chocolate. Similarly, do foreigners
really prefer products from their own countries? Think about foreign
demand for American jeans, fast food, movies and music. 127
Second, getting to the root of the argument, it is unclear
whether, or to what extent, the expansion of foreign operations by
U.S. multinationals benefits the entire U.S. economy. Advocates of
tax-based incentive programs aspire to create the impression with
Congress and the public that most U.S. multinational businesses

124.
Daniel J. Mitchell, International Provisions of Senate Tax Bill Undermine
U.S. Competitiveness, Executive Memorandum from Daniel J. Mitchell (May 12, 2003)
No. 878.
125.
Id. Mitchell claims that the proposed repeal of the FEIE is simply bad tax
policy based on "greed" since its repeal could increase U.S. tax revenues by more than
$32 million over the next decade.
126.
Letter from American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to Senator
Charles E. Grassley, supra note 75; see also U.S. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra
note 27, § VI.C (reporting that FEIE proponents argue that Americans abroad are
likely to created additional business for U.S. exporters and service providers because
they are "knowledgeable about and accustomed to" working with these companies).
127.

GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 372.
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conduct research in the United States (which creates high-paying
U.S. jobs) and invest overseas only to establish sales subsidiaries
(which increases U.S. exports). 128 While this may be true in certain
cases, "it is by no means the complete story. ' 129 Moreover, according
to a study by the U.S. General Accounting Office, export promotion
programs do not produce a substantial change in the level of domestic
employment since this is determined by macroeconomic policies of the
United States and its trading partners, including exchange rates, and
interest rates. 130 The Congressional Research Service has reached
similar conclusions. In one of its recent reports, this group explained
that economic theory indicates that the ultimate overall welfare of
the United States does not depend on exporting as much as possible
or on maximizing the competitiveness of U.S. multinationals
operating overseas. 131 Instead, the United States' general economic
well-being depends largely on whether investment locations are
distorted in inefficient manners, and on whether the benefits of
subsidies are obtained by U.S. individuals and businesses or whether
they flow out of the United States. 132 In the case of an export subsidy
(which the FEIE is in many senses), economic theory indicates that
its repeal would enhance the economic welfare of the United
States.133
Third, it may not be necessary to maintain a large number of
U.S. workers abroad in order to promote U.S. exports. On the
contrary, studies by the Congressional Research Service indicate that
local workers in foreign countries may serve as more effective
salespersons of U.S. products than a U.S. citizen living abroad since
the locals possess more in-depth knowledge regarding the native
134
language, culture, and market.
Finally, Section 911 may be overly broad in that it benefits many
U.S. expatriates whose potential influence in terms of exports is

128.
129.

Sullivan, supra note 100, at 422.
Id.

130.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXPORT PROMOTION: RATIONALES FOR AND
AGAINST GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND EXPENDITURES, GAO/T-GGD-95-169 (May

1995).
131.
David L. Brumbaugh, International Tax Provisions of the American
Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Act (H.R. 5095), as reprinted in 2002
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 188-231 (Sept. 27, 2002).
132.
Id.
133.
Id. (explaining that export subsidies artificially distort the allocation of
investment dollars, thereby causing an inefficient amount of capital to the export
sector and encouraging the country providing the subsidy to export more products than
is justified by economic analysis, and that a portion the subsidy is enjoyed by foreign
consumers as U.S. exporters transfer part of the benefit in the form of lower product
prices).
134.
Papahronis, supra note 59, at 596 (citing a study by the Congressional
Research Service entitled "U.S. Taxation of Citizens Working in Other Countries: An
Economic Analysis").
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practically nil. For instance, one survey concluded that forty-one
percent of those utilizing the FEIE are not in export-influencing
categories, among them teachers, preachers, lawyers, doctors, and
entertainers. 135
H. Additional Arguments against Section 911
In addition to the fact that the FEIE is inconsistent with U.S.
international tax policy, this program, and many of the arguments
made in support thereof, are suspect for a number of reasons. Of
extreme importance is the fact that the very studies relied on by
FEIE backers explicitly question or qualify their own conclusions. For
example, the report presented by professors at the Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies acknowledges
that the firms comprising the subject group were not "scientifically
selected" and their responses were not "necessarily reflective of the
universe of U.S. firms engaged in overseas activities."'1 36 This report
further acknowledges that many of the questions presented to these
firms were subjective or hypothetical and that "no attempt [was]
made to confirm the accuracy of the responses.' 1 37 Like the report
produced by the Johns Hopkins University, the reports by the U.S.
General Accounting Office also expressly recognize their own
shortcomings, as well as those of other related studies. For instance,
the GAO report in 1981 explains that the evaluation of the
effectiveness of personal tax incentives for promoting exports and
commercial competitiveness abroad has been scant. 138 What's worse,
the few studies that have been made "have not been generally
accepted as authoritative" and "cannot be accepted with great
confidence" because of the limitations of these studies in terms of
data and methodologies. 139 With regard to its own research, this
GAO report acknowledges that "[t]he data suffers from the
weaknesses of much survey data in that it was collected without
verification from parties with a vested interest in the outcome of the
study."'140 An earlier report by the GAO was equally frank in
recognizing its own limited value. In its 1978 report, this organization

135.
Id. at 597 (concluding that Section 911 represents "a government bonus for
temporary foreign employment which is unrelated to any specific national objective
[since] the incentives of the exclusion apply equally to all situations, whether they
promote exports or not").
136.
Pearson & Riedel, supra note 121, at § V.
137.
Id. (arguing that, despite the limitations of this report and the evidencecollection methods utilized, it still "sheds useful light" regarding the benefits of the
FEIE to U.S. international competitiveness, exports, and employment).
138.

AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT, supra note 82, at 3-4.

139.
140.

Id.
Id. at 6.
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admitted that the full economic impact of the reduction of the FEIE
could not be measured with any precision "not only because needed
data are lacking but also because the secondary benefits to the Nation
from having Americans abroad are so difficult to determine.' 141 The
principal studies used to support the FEIE may also suffer from
decreased legitimacy since they were both paid for by the Section 911
142
Coalition, the leading special-interest group in this area.
The FEIE is also questionable since it is not restricted such that
it only benefits U.S. employees of U.S. multinational businesses.
Indeed, a "qualified individual" who works for a foreign employer can
also take advantage of the FEIE. 143 In cases where U.S. citizens work
for foreign companies, the U.S. tax system is effectively providing a
tax subsidy to the foreign companies, which encourages them (by
allowing them to pay lower compensation to U.S. employees who can
exclude certain amounts of income from U.S. taxation) to invest in
business operations in a foreign country instead of in the United
States. 144 Putting it lightly, this is "certainly a strange use of the U.S.
145
tax system."'
The "housing cost amount" constitutes another point of criticism
of the FEIE. As explained above, Section 911 allows U.S. taxpayers
abroad to exclude from gross income the "foreign earned income" and
the "housing cost amount."'1 46 Permitting an exemption for the
"housing cost amount" is odd from a tax policy perspective since one
of the principal justifications for the $80,000 annual foreign earned
income exclusion is to compensate U.S. citizens living and working
abroad for their increased costs of living. 147 In other words, the
housing cost amount is somewhat duplicative of foreign earned
income, thereby permitting certain persons to receive a double tax
benefit. The housing cost amount is also called into question since
these expenses would not normally meet the criteria for exclusions in
cases of employer-provided housing. 148 Under Section 119 of the
Code, an employee may exclude from gross income the value of any
lodging furnished by the employer, but only if the employee is
required to accept such lodging as a condition of employment, the
lodging is located on the business premises of the employer, and the

141.
AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT, supra note 82, at 10.
142.
House Ways & Means Hearing, supra note 4, at 132. The leader of this
group acknowledged that the Section 911 commissioned in 1995 two "independent"
studies by PriceWaterhouse LLP and professors at the Johns Hopkins University to
examine the impact of the FEIE on U.S. business.
143.

GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 372.

144.
145.
146.

Id.

Id.
I.R.C. § 911(a) (2004).

147.

GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 378.

148.

Id. at 379.
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lodging is provided for the convenience of the employer. 149 In
defending the housing cost amount under the FEIE, one could argue
that certain living expenses of U.S. taxpayers abroad should be
attributed to the work itself such that the taxpayer meets, in a
certain sense, the requirements of Section 119.150 The more credible
response, however, is that the FEIE in general and the "housing cost
amount" in particular are mainly the byproducts of effective lobbying
by U.S. multinationals. Stated more bluntly, "the exclusion of the
housing cost amount is yet another tax subsidy granted to U.S.
persons who work abroad (and their employees)."'151

VI. POLITICAL REALITIES SURROUNDING SECTION 911

Those who would be negatively affected by the repeal of the
FEIE have battled fervently for its continued existence, including
Democrats Abroad, 152 the Construction Coalition to Save American
Jobs Overseas, 153 the Center for Freedom and Prosperity, 15 4 various
business lobbyists, 155 American Citizens Abroad, 156 the Section 911
Coalition, 157 Americans for Tax Reform, 15 8 the U.S. Council for
International Business, 159 the American Council of Engineering

I.R.C. § 119(a) (2004).
149.
150.
GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 378.
151.
Id.
152.
DemocratsAbroad, supra note 114.
153.
Johnathan Rickman & Herman Ayayo, U.S. Senate Keeps Foreign Earned
Income Exclusion Repeal, 2003 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 95-1 (May 16, 2003).
154.
Id.
155.
Richard Simon & Janet Hook, Senate Bill Would End Tax Break for
Overseas Workers, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at A20 (reporting that business lobbyists
were angered about the proposed repeal of Section 911 since they considered
themselves a "driving force behind President Bush's economic growth initiative").
156.
Lauren Foster, Expats Face Big Increase in Tax Payments, FIN. TIMES, May
10, 2003, at A2 (reporting that the leader of this group claimed that the repeal of the
FEIE and the resulting double taxation of Americans abroad would be "an economic
weapon of mass destruction").
157.
House Ways & Means Hearing, supra note 4; Susan Milligan, Panel's Bill
Boosts Expatriates' Taxes Group Says Hike Would Hurt US Competitiveness, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 9, 2003, at A2; Proposal to Add Taxes for US Citizens Abroad Draws Fire,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 15, 2003.
158.
Milligan, supra note 157 (reporting that the president of this organization
categorized the idea of repealing the FEIE as "economically destructive" and "stupid").
159.
Letter from Dan Nichols, Chair U.S. Council for International Business Tax
Committee, to The Honorable William Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (May 12,
2003), available at http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?DocumentID=2606 (last visited
March 20, 2004) (explaining that this group understands the political pressure to
generate revenues to offset the tax-relief measures recently introduced in the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003, but arguing that targeting U.S.
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Companies, 160 the American Business Council of the Gulf
Countries, 161 the U.S Chamber of Commerce, 162 the National
Association of Manufacturers, 16 3 certain U.S. senators, 164 and
numerous U.S. expatriate individuals. 165 Despite their support for
this program, the analysis contained in the preceding pages clearly
illustrates that the FEIE violates established U.S. international tax
policy for a multiplicity of reasons. In particular, the FEIE fails to
achieve tax fairness because it achieves neither vertical equity nor
horizontal equity, it does not minimize tax complexity or facilitate tax
compliance, and it lacks economic efficiency because it does not
generate capital export neutrality. In addition, the claims that the
FEIE promotes U.S. exports, benefits the United States by
disseminating cultural ambassadors, or represents a cost-efficient
subsidy for U.S. multinational businesses are all based on scarce or
questionable research. Perhaps more telling, the studies on which
FEIE backers heavily rely expressly acknowledge their own
shortcomings and biases.
Notwithstanding the validity or number of reasons for repealing
the FEIE immediately, it is highly improbable that such a legislative

multinationals and their U.S. workers fails to recognize the importance of the U.S.
export sector to the national economy).
160.
ACEC Continues Opposition to Proposed Repeal of Section 911 Tax Code,
LAST WORD, May 19, 2003, at http://www.acec.org/publications/lastword/lw051903.htm
(last visited Mar. 20, 2004).
161.
Brian Knowlton, Congress Nears Deal on Tax Cuts; In Expatriate Victory,
Exclusion Stays Alive, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 22, 2003, at Al.
162.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Letter to Senator Charles Grassley, May 6,
2003, availableat http://www.uschamber.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2004) ("At the same
time we are searching for ways to encourage and increase employment of U.S. workers,
this measure [i.e., the repeal of the FEIE] appears to undercut that important
objective. In a similar vein, raising income taxes on these [expatriate] workers would
be at odds with the income tax cuts that the President wishes to grant them."); see also
Alex Nicholson, U.S. to Keep Expat Tax Exemption, MOSCOW TIMES, May 22, 2003,
available at http://www.lexis.com (reporting that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in
Moscow indicated that repealing the FEIE would hinder the work of non-governmental
organizations in Russia, which would damage the U.S. contribution to "Russia's
transition to a democratic market economy").
163.
Letters from National Association of Manufacturers to Senator Bill Frist
(May 15 and 21, 2003) availableat http://www.nam.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2004).
164.
149 CONG. REC. S72,6174-6175 (daily ed. May 14, 2003) (statement by Sen.
Breaux).
165.
Similar to the case in 2003, the proposed modification or repeal of the FEIE
in 1996 incited strong opposition from Americans working abroad. In response to their
letters, the Deputy International Tax Counsel of the U.S. Treasury Department
assured these Americans abroad that the Clinton Administration's final budget for
1997 did not contain any changes to the FEIE. See Daniel M. Berman, Administration
Has No Plans to Repeal Exclusion, Treasury Says, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L 883, 883 (1996);
Daniel M. Berman, Repeal of Foreign Earned Income Exclusion Not in the Offing, 13
TAX NOTES IN'L 513, 513 (1996); Daniel M. Berman, Treasury Says President's 1997
Budget Doesn't Propose to Repeal Exclusion, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 2039, 2040, June 14,
1996.
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maneuver will occur in the near future for economic and political
reasons; some apparent, others more obscure. As certain tax experts
astutely point out, no thorough evaluation of income tax policy may
overlook political realities, among them the fact that even
international tax proposals supported by sound economic analysis
166
and income tax theory must confront "difficult political hurdles.'
A. The Rebuilding of Iraq
The benefits of Section 911 are ordinarily unavailable in cases
where a U.S. taxpayer is earning income in a foreign country that is
essentially "blackballed" by the U.S. government under the Trading
with the Enemy Act or the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act. 167 Consequently, a U.S. citizen working in Iraq would
normally be prohibited from benefiting from the tax advantages of the
FEIE. 6 8s However, in light of the recent war with and reconstruction
of Iraq, the U.S. Treasury Department has radically changed this
policy.' 6 9 In particular, the Office of Foreign Assets Control publicly
acknowledged that it had issued several licenses authorizing persons
to engage in transactions related to Iraq and that such activities do
17
not violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
Therefore, the normal limitation under Section 911 would not
17 1
apply.
To say that the Bush Administration has made the rebuilding of
Iraq a high priority would be a gross understatement. In fact, many
political analysts believe that this issue will be the focus of the
presidential election in 2004.172 In order to ensure that this

166.
CHARLES
H. GUSTAFSON
ET AL.,
TAXATION
OF
TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXTS AND PROBLEMS 27 (2nd ed. 2001).

167.
168.

INTERNATIONAL

I.R.C. § 911(d)(8) (2004).
Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 575 (1992); Rev. Rul. 92-63, 1992-2

C.B. 195.

169.
I.R.S. Notice 2003-52 (July 11, 2003); Press Release, U.S. Treasury
Department, Office of Public Affairs, Treasury and IRS Issue Guidance for U.S.
Individuals Working in Iraq." (July 11, 2003).
170.
Internal Revenue Service, Guidance on the Application of Section 911 to
Individuals Working in Iraq, 2003 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 136-14 (July 16, 2003).
171.
Id.
172.
See, e.g., Bob Kemper, Bush, GOPRevel in Medicare,Economy; But War on
Terror, Iraq Developments Loom Over '04 Race, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 26, 2003, at Cll
(stating that the issues of Iraq and the economy "rank very high with voters"); Adam
Nagourney, Campaign Tactics Being Reversed as Events Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2003, at Al; Richard A. Ryan, NASCAR Dads May Drive Race to White House for
Democrats; Group Key to Carrying Mich., Southern States, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 30,
2003, at 13A (explaining that Democrats believe that President Bush is vulnerable "on
a sour economy that has cost the nation nearly 3 million jobs" and the war in Iraq that
is resulting in deaths of U.S. soldiers on a daily basis); Howard Fineman and Tamara
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reconstruction project is successful, the Bush Administration
continues to use U.S. companies to perform work that the United
Nations and not-for-profit organizations could handle at a lower
cost. 1 73 For instance, the Bush Administration is paying hundreds of
millions of dollars to U.S. companies to do assorted projects, including
major infrastructure projects (such as roads and bridges), harbor
dredging, repairs to electrical systems, reconstructing buildings,
restructuring the Iraqi school system, and providing health
services. 174 With regard to why the Bush Administration prefers that
U.S. businesses complete the projects in Iraq, commentators
speculate that the president "wants to show the Iraqi people that
benefits are flowing to them from the United States, something that
wouldn't happen if the United Nations and private aid groups played
1 75
a leading role."'
In October 2003, Congress approved an $87.5 billion spending
package in connection with the reconstruction of Iraq. 176 Although
U.S. companies have been awarded the contracts for nearly all of the
major reconstruction projects to date, the recent legislation provides
that bids from foreign companies must be considered. 177 This
possibility of ferocious foreign competition is worrisome to many U.S.
companies, especially in light of the fact that complaints of cronyism
involving Vice President Cheney's former company abound.' 7 8
Many U.S. companies claim that Section 911 is essential for
them to be competitive in the international bidding process. The
Construction Coalition to Save American Jobs Overseas, for example,
recently sent a letter to Congress stating that President Bush has
made rebuilding Iraq "a cornerstone of his foreign policy," and that
U.S. construction companies are eager to obtain contracts to help

Lipper, The Right Stuffing, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8, 2003, at 30-35; James Carney, The
Politicsof War, TIME, Dec. 8, 2003, at 30-33.
173.
Mark Matthew, U.S. Defends Private Sector's Iraq Contracts, BALTIMORE
SUN, Aug. 10, 2003, at 1A.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.

176.
Neil King, Jr., Few Companies May Lead Iraq Work, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10,
2003, at A3, All.
177.

Id.

178.
Id. (stating that the Bush Administration has already endured harsh
criticism for alleged cronyism and mismanagement in the handling of approximately $2
million in Iraqi reconstruction projects); see also Nelson Antosh, Halliburton Employee
Dies in Iraq, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 6, 2003, at A13; Neela Banerjee, Bechtel Ends
Move for Work in Iraq, Seeing a Done Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at Cl; David
Ivanovich, Bidders Hope to Grab What's Left of Iraq Work, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 13,
2003, at Al; David Streitfeld, New Iraq Contracts Offer Just 'Scraps,' L.A. TIMES, Aug.
14, 2003, at Al. (stating that upon withdrawing from the competitive bidding process
for work in Iraq, one executive at the Bechtel Group explained that the remaining
contracts offer merely "bits and scraps" and that they "were too small to bother with").
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with this effort. 17 9 However, this organization underscores the fact
that the competition for these opportunities is fierce as companies the
world over attempt to outbid one another for such lucrative
contracts. 180 This group concludes, therefore, that repealing the FEIE
"not only weakens the President's stated objective to rebuild and
strengthen a democratic Iraq, but it further hurts Americans
attempting to find jobs all over the world."' 1 Seconding this opinion,
the Associated General Contractors of America point out that quickly
restoring Iraqi infrastructure is a major foreign policy initiative of the
Bush Administration and that revoking Section 911 "impedes the
attempts of American construction and engineering companies to help
1 82
the President achieve his goals."'
In view of the Bush Administrations' desire successfully to
rebuild Iraq and the importance of the FEIE for those U.S. companies
involved in this process, serious possibilities of repealing Section 911
may not appear for years. Meanwhile, virtually all reconstructionrelated projects in Iraq will continue to be performed by U.S. entities
183
through U.S. government contracts.
B. HistoricalSupport of Tax-Based Export Promotion
The United States has a long history of providing incentives that
serve to lessen the overall tax burden on export income, thereby
enabling U.S. exporters to charge lower prices for their goods and
services without reducing their net profit. 184 Export incentives have

179.
Construction Coalition to Save American Jobs Overseas, U.S. Construction
Coalition Letter to Grassley Opposing End to 911 Income Exclusion, 2003 WORLDWIDE
TAX DAILY 95-12 (May 16, 2003).
180.
Id.
181.

Id.

182.
Repeal of Section 911 Would Compromise U.S. Construction Industry's Efforts
to Help Rebuild Iraq, Says AGC, U.S. NEWSWIRE, May 13, 2003; see also, What Would the
Tax Cut Bills Mean for Contractors?,CONTRACTOR'S BUS. MGMT. REP., June 2003, at 1;
Sherie Winston, Senate Passes Tax Bill That House May Find Hard to Swallow,
ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., May 26, 2003, at 15.

183.

Kenneth E. Mack, Opportunities Abroad for U.S. Companies in Iraq, J.

INT'L TAX'N, Nov. 2003, at 7-11 (explaining that reconstruction effort in Iraq is a "high

priority" of the Bush Administration and that U.S. government contracts are presently
the "primary means of performing reconstruction activity in Iraq").
184.

GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 166, at 853 (noting that "[o]ver the years

Congress has followed a fairly consistent pattern of providing tax incentives to
[t]he most obvious examples [being] the Western Hemisphere
encourage exports ....
trade corporations, the export trade corporation, the DISC, the FSC and, most recently,
the exclusion of qualifying foreign trade income"). See also BORIS BITTKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 71-73 (2002); Mihir A. Desai &

James R. Hines, Jr., The Uneasy Marriageof Export Incentives and the Income Tax, in
15 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 43 (National Bureau of Economic Research 2001);
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE TRADE DISPUTE RELATING TO THE PRIOR-LAW
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come in several forms over the years, including tax reductions of
various degrees, outright tax exemptions, and tax deferrals on the
income earned from exportation.18 5 These tax-based export incentives
have been introduced under a variety of names, such as Western
Hemisphere Trade Corporations, Domestic International Sales
Corporations, Foreign Sales Corporations, and the Extraterritorial
Income Regime.' 8 6 Notwithstanding the differences in name and
design, each of these four programs has met the same fate over the
years: rejection by the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a
violation of the relevant international trade rules.' 8 7 As a
manifestation of the importance of these export-enhancement
programs to the United States, congressional debate regarding the
Extraterritorial Income Regime continues to rage despite that fact
that, pursuant to the WTO ruling in 2001, the European Union is
entitled to take retaliatory action against the United States in the
188
amount of four billion dollars annually.
As discussed previously, one of the major policy reasons behind
the FEIE is that it allegedly increases U.S. exports. According to
formula presented by FEIE supporters, Section 911 causes U.S.
multinational businesses operating abroad to hire U.S. workers, who
will purchase supplies from and retain the services of other U.S.
companies. This, in turn, will generate a higher demand for U.S.
exports.' 8 9 The numerous holes in this argument are examined
earlier in this article. Despite theoretical weaknesses and a scarcity
of corroborating evidence, Section 911, in its capacity as a tax-based
export promotion program, has proven historically difficult to
repeal. i90 Now, during a period in which other export-enlargement
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Sanctions, DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 11, 2002, at G-10. The United States unsuccessfully
argued that $4 billion per year in retaliation was exorbitant, urging the WTO to reduce
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911 paves "the way for more U.S. citizens overseas to buy American, sell American,
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initiatives such as the Extraterritorial Income Regime face potential
extinction, revoking the FEIE could prove to be even more arduous.

C. Dwindling U.S. Global Presence in Times of Terrorism and SARS
As discussed above, FEIE supporters claim that the presence of
U.S. citizens in foreign countries may benefit the U.S. government by
generating increased U.S. exports and spreading international
goodwill. To the dismay of FEIE backers, the allure of living and
working abroad is waning these days for at least two reasons. First,
living in certain countries may expose U.S. citizens to potentially
fatal diseases such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, which is
better known as SARS. In the Chinese capital of Beijing, more than
fifty cases of SARS were officially diagnosed in 2003, and many
suspect that the true incidence of the disease was significantly
higher. 19 1 As a result of this health threat, conferences and tours
were canceled in China and "many expatriates are considering
moving their families out."'1 92 For its part, the U.S. Embassy in China
announced that it would pay for the evacuation of all non-emergency
personnel and their dependents due to the uncertainty regarding the
SARS outbreak in that country. 193 Despite these precautions, at least
one American teaching in China died from the disease. 194 Along with
China, the World Health Organization identified at least thirty other
nations infected with SARS. 195 Noteworthy to many U.S. citizens was
the SARS outbreak in Toronto, Canada, which killed nearly fifty
people and dissuaded many U.S. travelers from heading north in
2003.196
The second reason for the decline in the number of U.S. citizens
living abroad is terrorism. A poignant example of this international
terrorism recently occurred in Saudi Arabia, where more than forty
Americans were injured in a series of bombings and shootings. 197 In
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L12.
196.
Travel Updates, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, at M2.
197.
Corky Siemaszko, Bombings Injure 40 Americans, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May
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response to these attacks, the U.S. State Department warned U.S.
citizens to leave the country if possible, a suggestion heeded by
hundreds. 198 Likewise, the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, recently
underwent an emergency closure as a result of a threatened attack by
al Qaeda operatives. 199 In a related event, on the same day that the
Spanish police arrested sixteen suspected international terrorists, the
U.S. State Department issued an alert to all U.S. citizens abroad:
prepare to evacuate. 200 On other occasions, the U.S. State
of the heightened
Department has informed U.S. citizens overseas
20 1
danger of terrorism and antiwar sentiment.
Supporters of the FEIE have capitalized on the increased
incidence of terrorism to challenge those advocating its repeal. For
example, exploiting the intensifying unrest of certain militant groups
and its effect on the U.S. psyche, the leader of the Section 911
Coalition has argued,
As the recent terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia made clear, Americans
abroad are putting their lives on the line to promote U.S. interests.
Except for the president, no one plays a more important role in
projecting a positive image of the United States around the globe than
do the more than 4 million private Americans residing abroad . . . In
service to their country, Americans abroad have faced every kind of
threat imaginable. Despite these dangers, they have refused to be
intimidated into retreating to the United States. But overseas
Americans are not accustomed to being targeted by their own
government. Let's hope it never happens again. Otherwise, the U.S.
where
government may succeed in driving Americans home in droves
202
Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein and the others all failed.

Under normal circumstances, it is unlikely that such
antagonistic comments would influence U.S. decision makers.
However, during this period characterized by bravado, singlemindedness, and extreme patriotism, this type of argument could
sway the decisions of those in Congress and the Bush Administration.
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D. High Unemployment Rates
As discussed earlier, enticing highly-qualified U.S. citizens to
work abroad has been a component of U.S. policy for many years.
History has proven that achieving this goal can be difficult. From the
perspective of the potential U.S. employee, engaging in international
endeavors may be unappealing for various reasons, including
problems with assimilating to new cultures and languages,
considerable anti-Americanism in many regions of the world, lack of
physical proximity to the corporate power base resulting in decreased
influence and upward mobility due to the out-of-sight-out-of-mind
phenomenon, and the increase in two-career families. 203 Similarly,
from the U.S. multinational companies' point of view, hiring a U.S.
taxpayer may be unattractive since to do so a company must
ordinarily reimburse these workers for the additional taxes and for
the added living costs. 20 4 Many U.S. businesses operating abroad
thus face a dilemma: pay U.S. workers more than foreigners with
comparable qualifications or utilize a tax-equalization program to
compensate U.S. workers for the additional tax burden. Either way,
U.S. businesses will face an increased financial burden, one which
"many employers are unwilling to accept even if the U.S. worker is
'20 5
more productive and has better professional qualifications.
Due to certain disadvantages of hiring U.S. taxpayers for
international assignments (both from the employees' and the
employers' perspectives), logic dictates that fulfilling the U.S. policy
of placing skilled U.S. citizens abroad would be implausible without
an incentive such as Section 911. Certain studies have also reached
this conclusion, estimating that the repeal of the FEIE would result
in a loss of approximately 7,000 overseas jobs and 140,000 domestic
jobs in the export sector. 20 6 The U.S. Council for International
Business employed this argument when criticizing a recent bill that
would have abolished the FEIE. According to this organization,
repeal of the FEIE would lead to the shifting of "tens of thousands" of
jobs now held by U.S. citizens abroad to foreign workers or to
increased costs for U.S. multinationals. 20 7 To ensure that the point
did not escape the attention of the public, Congress, and the Bush
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Administration, this group further explained that higher taxes for
U.S. citizens abroad and/or increased costs for U.S. businesses would
undoubtedly "add to the growing numbers of Americans unable to
find work at home. '20 8 This, it is argued, would "send the wrong
signal" to U.S. multinationals and U.S. taxpayers who already must
20 9
cope with a sluggish economy.
Aside from its handling of the war on terrorism, the slow
domestic economy that has plagued the United States during recent
years represents the Achilles' heal of the Bush Administration.
Indeed, presidential hopefuls for the 2004 election have continually
emphasized the negative impact of the current economy on the U.S.
public, hoping in this manner to exploit a vulnerability of President
Bush.2 10 Mindful of this, the Bush Administration has taken various
steps to stimulate the economy, including introducing tax cuts
designed, among other things, to create new jobs. Lest there be any
doubt regarding the focus of the recent economic stimulus package,
the legislation itself is called the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and
Reconciliation Act of 2003.211 According to a recent release by the
U.S. Treasury Department, ensuring that any economic growth
resulting from the tax cuts generates additional jobs for U.S. workers
is pivotal.2 12 Although certain studies indicate the creation of over
300,000 positions during the last quarter of 2003, the national
unemployment rate is still significant. 2 13 Therefore, with a
presidential election approaching rapidly, political wisdom would
indicate that the Bush Administration will be reluctant, or outright
unwilling, to endorse any legislation that would repeal the FETE and
focus public attention on the possibility of additional job loss.

VII. CONCLUSION

The FEIE may be well-intentioned, but the majority of the
evidence demonstrates that this program violates many aspects of
U.S. international tax policy. Furthermore, when analyzed as a pure
tax incentive, the FEIE's cost effectiveness is circumspect.
Nonetheless, repeal of the FEIE in the near future is unlikely because
of the existing political realities. The identification of this non
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sequitur is not aimed at maligning the FEIE or those who benefit
therefrom. Instead, the purpose of this Article is to remind (or
perhaps encourage) all of those involved or interested in the field of
international taxation to embrace their child-like curiosity and never
stop asking "why?"

